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Abstract—For the sake of protecting data privacy and due
to the rapid development of mobile devices, e.g., powerful
central processing unit (CPU) and nascent neural processing unit
(NPU), collaborative machine learning on mobile devices, e.g.,
federated learning, has been envisioned as a new AI approach
with broad application prospects. However, the learning process
of the existing federated learning platforms rely on the direct
communication between the model owner, e.g., central cloud or
edge server, and the mobile devices for transferring the model
update. Such a direct communication may be energy inefficient
or even unavailable in mobile environments. In this paper, we
consider adopting the relay network to construct a cooperative
communication platform for supporting model update transfer
and trading. In the system, the mobile devices generate model
updates based on their training data. The model updates are
then forwarded to the model owner through the cooperative relay
network. The model owner enjoys the learning service provided
by the mobile devices. In return, the mobile devices charge the
model owner certain prices. Due to the coupled interference of
wireless transmission among the mobile devices that use the same
relay node, the rational mobile devices have to choose their relay
nodes as well as deciding on their transmission powers. Thus, we
formulate a Stackelberg game model to investigate the interaction
among the mobile devices and that between the mobile devices
and the model owner. The Stackelberg equilibrium is investigated
by capitalizing on the exterior point method. Moreover, we
provide a series of insightful analytical and numerical results
on the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game.
Index Terms—Federated learning, Security privacy, Energy
efficient, Network optimization, Stackelberg game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the explosive growth of smart IoT devices at the
edge of the Internet, massive data collection through embedded
sensors on mobile devices, e.g., crowdsensing, for machine
learning has found a number of applications and gained
tremendous popularity rapidly [1]. However, the existing ma-
chine learning approaches rely on centralized storage of the
training data. Consequently, they usually face a series of data
security and privacy issues, e.g., data abuse and information
leakage. A recent report from Ponemon Institute suggests an
average cost of over $200 for per record of data breach [2].
Such a high economic loss has hindered the adoption of
data sharing among the different entities, and the machine
learning that requiring centralized data storage is facing great
challenges.
To overcome the limitations of traditional machine learning
in the protection of data privacy, a novel paradigm has been
proposed. In [3], the federated learning system was introduced
to address the issue of data privacy. Therein, the mobile
devices perform computation of model training locally on
their training data according to the model released by the
model owner. Such design enables mobile device to collab-
oratively learn a shared prediction model while keeping all
the training data on the device [4]. However, the independent
and rational mobile devices need incentive to participate in
federated learning. In practice, asking the mobile devices to
work as sacrificial volunteers is not an economically viable
and sustainable option. Moreover, in the federated learning
paradigm, the direct communication between model owner and
mobile devices is still required for transferring model updates,
i,e., Fig. 1(a). In many scenarios, the direct communication
may be unavailable because of limited transmission range and
energy inefficiency because of high transmission power.
To address the incentive issues of the mobile devices, we
adopt the service pricing scheme to motivate the mobile
devices to participate in federated learning. Under the service
pricing scheme, the machine learning is provided by the
mobile devices as a service to the model owner. Then, the
learning service, i.e., model update generation and trading as
well as data collection, is performed in a decentralized manner.
Additionally, to overcome the energy inefficiency in the model
update transfer for the mobile devices, we resort to relay
networking to ensure that the model updates are transferred
in a cooperative manner. The mobile devices cooperatively
form a relay network by providing relay service to each other
and directly or indirectly connect to the access point of the
model owner for model update transfer, e.g., Fig. 1(b). Note
here that the mobile device that acts as the relay node will use
the average operator to combine its own model update with
its received model updates. Then, the file size of the model
update is not affected, and hence providing relay service does
not significantly affect the energy consumption of the mobile
devices.
In this paper, we propose a novel framework of cooperative
federated learning system. Our designed federated learning
system involves two parties, i.e., the massive-scale mobile
devices working as learning service providers, and the model
owner handling the learning task dispatching (model releasing)
and model updates collection. The mobile devices price their
learning service by deciding on the price of one unit of their
training data. In return, the model owner determines the size
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Figure 1: (a) Original communication scenario for federated
learning; (b) Our designed communication scenario for
federated learning.
of training data for each mobile device. As such, under the
service pricing scheme, the mobile devices optimize the prices
of their data to motivate the model owner to determine a
larger size of training data and hence maximize their profits.
However, under the cooperative relay network design, the
larger size of training data implies the lower probability of
enjoying the relay service. As a result, the learning service
pricing and cooperative relaying should be considered jointly.
By using the pricing-based data rent and a self-organized relay
network design shown in Fig 1(b) for federated learning, the
following key properties are guaranteed in our system:
• The model update throughput of the model owner scales
well such that the massive model update volume from the
mobile devices is handled smoothly.
• The rational and self-interested mobile devices noncoop-
eratively decide on their own price of one unit of training
data for individual profit optimization and cooperatively
transfer their model updates.
• Significantly reduces the congestion in the communica-
tion for both the model owner and the mobile devices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
scribes the system model. Section III presents the formulation
of a Stackelberg game. Section IV analyzes the equilibrium
of the proposed Stackelberg game. Section V presents the
numerical performance evaluation. Section VI concludes the
paper.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
We consider a cooperative federated learning system as
shown in Fig. 1(b). Specifically, a model owner employs a set
of mobile devices, e.g., mobile phones, to train a high-quality
centralized model [5]. The set of mobile devices is denoted by
N 0, e.g., mobile devices 1, 2, and 3 in Fig. 1(b). Each mobile
device i ∈ N 0 uses a part of its data and performs computation
on its data locally to generate the model update for training
the model of the model owner. The model owner negotiates
with the mobile devices about the size of their training data,
i.e., sdi . In return, each mobile device i ∈ N 0 will receive
Table I: Notations
Symbol Description
i, ND Node i and the access point of the model owner.
N 0 The set of mobile devices.
N , |N | N = N
0 ∪ {ND} =
{
1, 2, . . . ,
∣∣N 0∣∣ , ND} is a sorted set
and its cardinality.
Pij
The transmission power used by mobile device i to transfer
the model update to mobile device j.
T si , T
a
i
The time used by mobile device i for processing the model
update and average operator, respectively.
hij , dij
The channel gain of the transmission between mobile
devices i and j, and the distance between mobile
devices i and j.
qi, sdi
The price of one unit of training data for mobile device i
and the size of the data set used by mobile device i for
generated the model update.
cpi , c
t
i
The costs that mobile device i uses one unit of energy for
processing one unit of data and transferring, respectively.
ca
The fee that each mobile device i ∈ N charged by its rely
node for the relay service.
Id The size of the model update.
ri The transmission rate of mobile device i.
the revenue qisdi from the model owner, where qi is the price
for one unit of mobile device i’s training data. Intuitively, the
learning accuracy of the model depends on the total size of
all the mobile devices’ training data. Specifically, the learning
accuracy of the model becomes higher as the total size of
all the mobile devices’ training data increases. In this case,
we incorporate the results in [6] to describe the relationship
between the learning accuracy of the model and the total size
of all the mobile devices’ training data. As a result, the utility
of the model owner is defined as follows:
U
(
sd,q
)
= f
(
sd
)
−
∑
i∈N0
qis
d
i , (1)
where f (·) is the function describing the relationship between
the learning accuracy of the model and the total size of all
the mobile devices’ training data [6]. Note here that f (·)
is an increasing concave function implying that the learning
accuracy of the model keeps increasing as the size of training
data increases while the marginal increasing speed of the
learning accuracy of the model decreases [6].
The mobile devices can cooperate with each other for
transferring their model updates to the access point of the
model owner. Let Pij denote the transmission power used by
mobile device i for transferring its model update to mobile
device j, where we define the transmission power matrix
P = [pij ]i,j∈N . Iij is the element of the indicator matrix
I, i.e., I = [Iij ]i,j∈N , and defined as follows:
Iij =
{
1, Pij > 0
0,Otherwise
, ∀i, j ∈ N . (2)
To provide the learning service, mobile device i has the cost
of cpi s
d
i due to the energy consumption incurred from the com-
putation. Moreover, each mobile device i ∈ N 0 has another
cost incurred by the wireless transmission of its model update.
Let cti be the cost that mobile device i uses one unit of power
for wireless transmission, the instantaneous cost for mobile
device i incurred by the transmission is cti
∑
j∈N
Pij . Under the
assumption that the sizes of the model updates transferred by
the mobile devices are the same, the energy consumption from
the wireless transmission depends on the transmission rate of
each mobile device, i.e., ri. We denote the size of the model
update by Id. The time for transferring the model update is
accordingly I
d
ri
, and hence the energy consumption of mobile
device i incurred by the wireless transmission is cti
Id
ri
∑
j∈N
Pij .
Furthermore, with the relay service among the mobile devices,
each mobile device i ∈ N 0 will have a revenue of ca ∑
j∈N 0
Iji
due to its provided relay service while a cost of ca (1− IiND)
incurred by the use of the relay service. ca (1− IiND) comes
from the fact that mobile device i uses the relay service and
hence pay the fee ca if it does not directly transfer the model
update to the model owner, i.e., IiND = 0. Finally, with the
revenue of providing the learning service to the model owner,
i.e., qisdi , the corresponding profit of mobile device i is
Πi
(
P, qi, s
d
i
)
= qis
d
i − cti
Id
ri
∑
j∈N
Pij − cpi sdi
+ ca
∑
j∈N0
Iji − ca
(
1− IiND
)
.
(3)
To form the wireless relay networks among the mobile
devices and hence achieve the energy efficient communication
for the model update transfer, we have two sets of constraints.
The first set of the constraints is for the routing. The second
set of the constraints is for the model update arrival time at
the relay point.
For the routing, we first have the constraint to ensure that
every mobile device can connect to and transfer its model
update to only one of other mobile devices or directly to the
access point of the model owner. The constraint is expressed
as follows: ∑
j∈N
Iij = 1 and Iii = 0, ∀i ∈ N 0. (4)
Secondly, we have the constraint that at least one mobile
device connects to the access point of the model owner and
acts as one of the last-hop nodes. Otherwise, none of the
mobile devices can transfer the model update to the model
owner. The corresponding constraint is expressed as follows:∑
i∈N0
IiND ≥ 1. (5)
We then have the constraint that the model update of each
mobile device can finally and affirmatively arrive at the model
owner. That is, each mobile device can transfer its model
update to the model owner after a limited number of mobile
devices as its relay nodes, i.e.,
I|N0|−1 = ID, (6)
where
ID
> =

0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0
1 · · · 1

←1
...
← ∣∣N 0∣∣
←ND
. (7)
Regarding the constraint for the model update arrival time
on the relay node, we have the constraint in (8). This constraint
is to ensure that the model update of mobile device i will
arrive at mobile device j before mobile device j finishes the
computing of its model update if mobile device i wants to
transfer its model update by choosing mobile device j as its
relay node. The time used by mobile device i for providing
the learning service can be divided into three periods. The first
time period, denoted by T si , is for performing the computation
on the training data according to the model. The model update
is generated at the end of this time period. Suppose that rpi
is the processing rate of mobile device i, T si is accordingly
defined as T si =
sdi
rpi
[7]. The second time period is for mobile
device i to provide relay service to other mobile devices.
For each received model update from another mobile device,
mobile device i needs to spend the time of T ai for combining
the received model update with its own model update by using
the average operator. The length of the second time period
is therefore linearly related to the number of model updates
received by mobile device i, i.e., the number of mobile devices
that use mobile device i’s relay service
∑
j∈N
Iji, and expressed
as T ai
∑
j∈N
Iji. The last time period is for mobile device i to
transfer its model update and expressed as I
d
ri
, where ri is the
transmission rate of mobile device i defined in (9). To ensure
that mobile device i can successfully use the relay service
from other mobile devices, the sum of three time periods at
mobile device i must be shorter than the first time period of
its relay node, i.e.,
T si + T
a
i
∑
j∈N0
Iji +
Id
ri
≤
∑
j∈N0
IijT
s
j , ∀i ∈ N 0. (8)
We assume that the mobile devices using the same relay
node share the channel and hence generate mutual interference.
Let hij denote the channel gain from mobile device i to
mobile device j, dij be the distance between mobile devices
i and j, and α ≥ 2 be the path loss coefficient of wireless
communication. Then, we define a matrix H = [Hij ]i,j∈N ,
the element of which, i.e., Hij , is
hij
(dij)
α . Accordingly, the
propagation model for data transmission of mobile device i,
i.e., the transmission rate of mobile device i, ri is given by
ri = wilog2
1 +
∑
j∈N
hij
(dij)
α Pij
(HI (:, i))
> (PI (:, i))−
∑
j∈N
hij
(dij)
α Pij + σ2

= wilog2
(
1 +
(H (i, :))> (P (i, :))
(HI (:, i))
> (PI (:, i))− (H (i, :))> (P (i, :)) + σ2
)
,
(9)
where σ2 is the noise, wi is the bandwidth of mobile device
i, PI = PI>, and HI = HI>. Note here that we use H (i, :)
and H (:, i) to represent the i-th row vector and i-th column
vector of H, respectively, and the usage of this notation is
defined similarly in the rest of this paper.
III. STACKELBERG GAME FORMULATION
In this section, we model the interaction between the mobile
devices and the model owner as a Stackelberg game. In the
Stackelberg game, the model owner is the buyer as it uses
the learning service provided by the mobile devices. Then,
the mobile devices that are the service providers act as the
sellers. The sellers typically make their decisions before the
buyers. Following this case, the model owner inherently acts
as the single follower in the lower level of the Stackelberg
game while the mobile devices are the corresponding leaders.
In the lower level of the game, i.e., the lower-level subgame,
the model owner determines the size of training data for
the mobile devices. In the upper level, i.e., the upper-level
subgame, the mobile devices decide on the price for one unit
of their training data. Moreover, since the mobile devices
cooperatively send their model update to the model owner,
each mobile device also needs to independently decide on its
relay node as well as its transmission power. As a result, the
Stackelberg game can be formally defined as follows:
1) Lower-level subgame: Given the fixed vector of the
prices of one unit of training data q =
[
q1, . . . , q|N 0|
]>
,
the lower-level subgame is defined by the a three-tuple
GL =
{
sd,Sd, U
}
, where
• sd =
[
sd1 , . . . , s
d
|N 0|
]>
is the vector of the sizes of
training data;
• Sd =
{[
sd1 , . . . , s
d
|N 0|
]> ∣∣∣sdi ∈ [0, sd,ui ] , i ∈ N 0}
⊂ R|N 0| is the domain of definition for sd and an
M-polyhedron, where sd,ui is the upper bound of s
d
i ;
• U = U
(
sd,q
)
is the utility function of the model
owner defined in (1);
2) Upper-level subgame: After the model owner’s demand
of data size sd is determined in the lower-level subgame,
the mobile devices form a upper-level subgame defined
by a six-tuple GU =
{N 0,P,P,q,Q,Π}, where
• N 0 is the set of the mobile devices;
• P = [Pij ]i,j∈N is the matrix of the power for
wireless transmission;
• P =
{
[Pij ]i,j∈N
∣∣Pij ∈ [0, P uij] , i, j ∈ N } ⊂
R|N |×|N| is the domain of definition for P, where
P uij is the upper bound of Pij ;
• q =
[
q1, . . . , q|N 0|
]>
is the vector of prices for one
unit of training data.
• Q =
{[
q1, . . . , q|N 0|
]> ∣∣qi ∈ [0, qui ] , i ∈ N 0} ⊂
R|N 0| is the domain of definition for q and an M-
polyhedron, where qui is the upper bound of qi;
• Π =
[
Π1, . . . ,Π|N 0|
]>
is the vector of the profits
for the mobile devices, where Πi = Πi
(
P, qi, s
d
i
)
is the profit of mobile device i defined in (3).
Based on the game formulation, we consider a Stackelberg
equilibrium to be the solution for the model owner and the
mobile devices.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
By following the backward induction, we firstly use the
first-order optimality condition to obtain the optimal solution
to the lower-level subgame GL. The existence of the optimal
solution to the lower-level subgame GL is proven to exist by
showing the concavity of its utility function. This optimal
solution is further proven to be unique by showing the negative
definiteness of the Hessian matrix of the utility function of
the lower-level subgame GL. Then, we substitute the NE of
the lower-level subgame GL into the upper-level subgame GU
and investigate the solution to the upper-level subgame GU by
capitalizing on the exterior point method.
A. Solution to Lower-level Subgame
To find an optimal solution for the lower-level subgame GL,
we need to take the first derivative of the utility function of
the model owner given in (1) with respect to sdi as follows:
∂
∂sdi
U
(
sd,q
)
=
∂
∂sdi
f (sd)− ∑
i∈N0
qis
d
i

=− qi + ∂
∂sdi
f
(
sd
)
, ∀i ∈ N 0,
(10)
where f
(
sd
)
=
∑
i∈N 0
fi
(
sdi
)
. Without loss of generality
and for the trackable analysis, we adopt Weibull model as
suggested in [6], i.e., fi
(
sdi
)
= ai − bi exp
(−cisdi ). Let
∂
∂sdi
U
(
sd,q
)
= 0, ∀i ∈ N 0, we have sdi ∗, i.e., the best
response of the model owner, as follows:
− qi + ∂
∂sdi
f
(
sd
)
= −qi + ∂
∂sdi
[
ai − bi exp
(
−cisdi
)]
=− qi + cibi exp
(
−cisdi
)
= 0 ⇔ sdi
∗
=
1
ci
ln
cibi
qi
(11)
Due to the strict concavity of fi (·) and the linearity of −qisdi
with respect to sdi , U
(
sd,q
)
is therefore concave with respect
to sdi and its concavity indicates the existence of the solution to
the lower-level subgame GL. Moreover, with negative elements
on the primary diagonal and zero elements on the off-diagonal,
the Hessian matrix of U
(
sd,q
)
is negative definite, and hence
the solution to the lower-level subgame GL is unique.
B. Solutions to Upper-level Subgame
After obtaining the optimal demand of the data size for the
model owner, we investigate the upper-level subgame GU for
the mobile devices. At the Nash Equilibrium (NE), no player
can increase its profit by choosing a different strategy provided
that the other players’ strategy is unchanged [8]. We firstly
substitute the optimal demand of the data size for the model
owner given in (11) into the profit functions of the mobile
devices given in (3) and have the new profit functions for the
mobile devices as follows:
Πi (P, qi) =Πi
(
P, qi, s
d
i
∗)
= qi
1
ci
ln
cibi
qi
− cti
Id
ri
∑
j∈N
Pij
− cpi
1
ci
ln
cibi
qi
+ ca
∑
j∈N0
Iji − ca
(
1− IiND
) (12)
with the constraints (4)-(8). As the constraints (4)-(8) are
nonlinear, we adopt the exterior point method [9]. Then, we
can rewritten the constrained profit function of mobile device
i ∈ N 0, i.e., (12), into a unconstrained objective function as
follows:
Πi (P, qi,M) = qi
1
ci
ln
cibi
qi
− cti
Id
ri
∑
j∈N
Pij − cpi
1
ci
ln
cibi
qi
+ ca
∑
j∈N0
Iji − ca
(
1− IiND
)
+Mρ (P, qi) ,
(13)
where M is the penalty coefficient with huge positive value
and
ρ (P, qi) =
−
∑
j∈N
Iij − 1
2 − (Iii)2 − (I|N|−1 − ID)2
+
∑
i∈N
IiND − 1
+
∑
j∈N
IijT
s
j − T si − T ai
∑
j∈N
Iji − I
d
ri
 .
(14)
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present numerical studies to evaluate
the performance of the cooperative federated learning system.
For the ease of illustration, we consider 9 mobile devices, i.e,∣∣N 0∣∣ = 9, working as the learning entities. The bandwidth
and channel gain are respectively hij = 10 and wi = 1,
∀i, j ∈ N 0, and the noise σ2 is 1. The size of the model
update is assumed to be Id = 0.1. The distances among
the mobile devices as well as that between the mobile
devices and the access point of the model owner, i.e.,
d = [dij ]i,j∈N , follows a uniform distribution under the
plane of [0, 10]× [0, 10]. The vector of the costs of consuming
one unit of power for wireless communication is generated
by using Gaussian distribution and shown as follows:
ct = [cti]i∈N 0 = [58, 61, 51.5, 58.5, 95, 46, 175, 124.5, 31]
>.
Similarly, the following parameters are generated by
using Gaussian distribution. The vector of the costs
of processing one unit of data is cp = [cpi ]i∈N 0 =
[4.3, 8.5, 13.6, 9.5, 9.8, 6.7, 8.1, 5.5, 11.2] × 10−3. We
set the fee of relay service to be ca = 0.0096.
The vector of processing rate is rp = [rpi ]i∈N 0 =
[8.81, 8.93, 9.725, 6.165, 4.15, 4.195, 6.525, 8.215, 5.105,
5.96]
> × 10. The vector of the time of using average
operator for the mobile devices is Ta = [T ai ]i∈N 0 =
[1.21, 1.29, 0.53, 1.07, 1.07, 0.95, 1.3, 0.88, 0.72] × 10−2. The
coefficient of fi (·) defined in (1) is c = [cij ]i,j∈N 0 =
[15.28, 9.17, 14.31, 11.21, 9.12, 13.61, 13.27, 9.63, 14.32]
and a = [aij ]i,j∈N 0 = b = [bij ]i,j∈N 0 =
[9.78, 9.15, 11.35, 11.17, 12.7, 9.15, 12.38, 13.5, 10.59].
A. Numerical Result
For the convenience to observe the routing result for the
cooperative model update transfer, We present it in Fig. 2
and Table II. As shown in Fig. 2, the mobile devices self-
organize the wireless rely network for cooperative model up-
date transfer. For example, mobile device 3 uses mobile device
7 as the relay node for transferring the model update. This
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Figure 2: The wireless relay network for cooperative model
update transfer.
Table II: The routing result for cooperative model update
transfer.
Mobile device No. Routing
1 1→ ND.
2 2→ ND.
3 3→ 7→ ND.
4 4→ ND.
5 5→ 4→ ND.
6 6→ 4→ ND.
7 7→ ND.
8 8→ ND.
9 9→ ND.
can significantly reduce the energy consumption of wireless
communication for mobile device 3. Moreover, both mobile
devices 5 and 6 choose the same mobile device, i.e, mobile
device 4, as their relay node. This will incur the mutual
interference between mobile devices 5 and 6 and hence result
in energy inefficient communication. However, compared with
choosing other mobile devices as the relay node or directly
transferring the model update to the cental cloud, it is more
energy efficient to choose mobile device 4 as the relay node
for mobile devices 5 and 6.
We next evaluate the prices of one unit of training data
for the mobile devices. As shown in Fig. 3, we observe that
the price of one unit of training data for mobile device 7
is the highest one among the mobile device. The reason is
that the model update from mobile device 7 received by the
model owner is the combination of the model update from two
mobile devices, i.e., mobile devices 7 and 3 as shown in Fig. 2
and Table II. This means that the model update from mobile
device 7 contains much more valuable information than that
generated by using the model update from only one mobile
device, e.g., the model update of mobile devices 1, 2, and 8. In
contrast, although the model update from mobile device 4 is
the combination of the model updates from the model updates
of mobile devices 4, 5, and 6, the price of one unit of training
data for mobile device 4 is even less than that for mobile
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Figure 3: The price of one unit of the training data for each
device.
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Figure 4: The size of training data for each mobile device.
device 8. This is due to the data quality and the preference of
the model owner.
We then investigate the sizes of the training data for the
model owner. As shown in Fig. 4, the size of the training data
from mobile device 4 is the largest due to its lowest price
as shown in Fig. 3. Along with the slow processing rate of
mobile device 4, i.e., rp4 = 61.65, such a large size of data
of mobile device 4 implies that mobile device 4 will take
much time for performing computation on its training data.
Accordingly, it is likely that the model updates from other
mobile devices can arrive at mobile device 4 before the mobile
device 4 finishes is its computation. Thus, the mobile device
4 can serve as a relay for many other devices. As we observe
in Fig. 4, the sizes of data of mobile devices 5 and 6, i.e.,
the neighboring mobile devices of mobile device 4 as shown
in Fig. 2, are much smaller than that of mobile device 4. As
a result, mobile devices 5 and 6 choose mobile device 4 as
their relay node. This helps mobile devices 5 and 6 to avoid
transferring their model updates directly to the access point,
improving the energy efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented the Stackelberg game
model to analyze the transmission strategy and training data
pricing strategy of the self-organized mobile device as well as
the learning service subscription of the model owner in the
cooperative federated learning system. We have focused on
the interactions among the mobile devices and considered the
impact of the interference cost on the mobile devices’ profits.
Moreover, we have investigated the impact of the size of the
training data on both the model owner’s utility and the mobile
devices’s profits. Specifically, we have established a model
describing the impact of the mobile devices’ transmission
strategies on their transmission rates and relay node. The
model also describes the impact of the model owner’s learning
service subscription strategy on the model owner’s utility. We
have studied the optimal strategy of the model owner by using
best response and the equilibrium strategies of the mobile
devices by using the exterior point method. Our future work
will extend to the study in the long-run among the model
owner and the mobile devices.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Feng, W. Wang, D. Niyato, D. I. Kim and P. Wang, “Competitive
data trading in wireless-powered internet of things (iot) crowdsensing
systems with blockchain,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.10217, 2018.
[2] D. W. Opderbeck, “Cybersecurity, data breaches, and the economic loss
doctrine in the payment card industry,” Md. L. Rev., vol. 75, pp. 935,
2015.
[3] google, “Federated learning: Collaborative machine learning
without centralized training data,” https://ai.googleblog.com/2017/04/
federated-learning-collaborative.html, Accessed April 6, 2017.
[4] TensorFlow, “Machine learning and mobile: Deploy-
ing models on the edge,” https://blog.algorithmia.com/
machine-learning-and-mobile-deploying-models-on-the-edge/,
Accessed June 21, 2018.
[5] J. Konecny`, H. B. McMahan, D. Ramage and P. Richta´rik, “Federated
optimization: Distributed machine learning for on-device intelligence,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.02527, 2016.
[6] B. Gu, F. Hu and H. Liu, “Modelling classification performance for
large data sets,” in International Conference on Web-Age Information
Management. Springer, 2001, pp. 317–328.
[7] A. Gharaibeh, T. Reza, E. Santos-Neto, L. B. Costa, S. Sallinen and
M. Ripeanu, “Efficient large-scale graph processing on hybrid cpu and
gpu systems,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.3018, 2013.
[8] M. J. Osborne et al., An introduction to game theory, vol. 3, Oxford
university press New York, 2004.
[9] X. Yang, “An exterior point method for computing points that satisfy
second-order necessary conditions for a c1, 1 optimization problem,”
Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, vol. 187, no. 1, pp.
118–133, 1994.
